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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 27/01/2008

Accident number: 514

Accident time: Not made available

Accident Date: 26/06/2003

Where it occurred: Not made available

Country: Iraq

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: None

Date of main report: Not made available
Name of source: [Name removed]

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: BLU-97 submunition

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 27/01/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not made available

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate survey (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate training (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)

Accident report
Details of this accident have been withheld by the demining NGO that employed the Victim. A
spreadsheet including the Victim’s name and very brief details of the accident was made
available in 2007. Some details can be inferred from the information released. For example, it
is reasonable to presume that the Victims were repositioning markers inside the area known
to be cleared/safe.
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This entry will be expanded if access to the report of the investigation is made available in
future.
The spreadsheet data is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
“Date and country. [Name removed]: fatal
[Name removed]: fatal
BLU 97 detonated when two members of staff moving to reposition minefield
markers, suspected stepped on partially buried BLU-97.”
[From interview with demining group staff, it is known that the task was a BLU-97 strike area
and not a minefield.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 672

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: Not made available

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT: Multiple injury: No medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 673

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: Not made available

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT: Multiple injury: No medical report was made available.
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Analysis
This incident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because it seems that the device that
detonated was inside the area cleared. If it was not, then this would become yet another
“Survey accident” (the demining group had several in Iraq at this time). The primary cause of
this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victims went to place
markers in an area that was believed to be safe but which was not. Those responsible for the
work should have kept an accurate record of the safe area. It seems that the field controllers
may also have allowed safety distances to be ignored. The secondary cause is listed as a
“Management control inadequacy” because the management of the demining group declined
to make the accident details available. Although this is sometimes done to protect the Victims,
in this case the Victims’ names were among the limited detail made available. It is possible
that the managers have chosen to avoid transparency because they are afraid that the
circumstances of the accident would reflect badly on their organisation.
It is known that the Victims had been recently moved from the North of Iraq to conduct
submunition clearance and it is possible that they did not fully understand the threat posed by
the BLU-97 and its potential sensitivity to any movement, including the placement of markers
close by.
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